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O V E R LI N E  
A global surveillance system for crop diseases 
Global preparedness minimizes the risk to food supplies.  
By M. Carvajal-Yepes,1 K. Cardwell,2 A. Nelson,3 K. Garrett,4 B. Giovani,5 D.G.O. Saunders,6 S. Kamoun,7 J. Legg,8 V. Verdier,9 J. Lessel,10 R.A. 
Neher,11 R. Day,12 P. Pardey,13 M.L. Gullino,14 A.R. Records*,15* B. Bextine,16 J.E. Leach,17 S. Staiger,1 J. Tohme1 
To satisfy growing demand for food, global 
agricultural production must increase by 
70% by 2050. However, pests and crop dis-
eases put global food supplies at risk. World-
wide, yield losses caused by pests and dis-
eases are estimated to average 21.5% in 
wheat, 30.0% in rice, 22.6% in maize, 17.2% 
in potato, and 21.4% in soybean [1]; these 
crops account for half of the global human 
calorie intake [2]. Climate change and global 
trade drive the distribution, host range, and 
impact of plant diseases [3], many of which 
can spread or re-emerge after having been 
under control [4] (see photo). Though many 
national and regional plant protection organ-
izations (NPPOs and RPPOs) work to moni-
tor and contain crop disease outbreaks, 
many countries, particularly low-income 
countries (LICs) do not efficiently exchange 
information, delaying coordinated responses 
to prevent disease establishment and spread. 
To improve responses to unexpected crop 
disease spread, we propose a Global Surveil-
lance System (GSS) that will extend and 
adapt established biosecurity practices and 
networking facilities into LICs, enabling 
countries and regions to quickly respond to 
emerging disease outbreaks to stabilize food 
supplies, enhancing global food protection.  
Global networks have improved human 
health, expediting global responses to hu-
man infectious disease outbreaks. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the U.S. Cen-
ter for Disease Control and Prevention ad-
dressed challenging public health problems 
more effectively and rapidly by developing 
and maintaining surveillance systems with 
well-established network labs for diagnosis 
and promoting norms for sharing data and 
information during outbreaks [14]. In a simi-
lar spirit, with the United Nations General As-
sembly having proclaimed 2020 as the Inter-
national Year of Plant Health to increase 
awareness among the public and policymak-
ers about the importance of plant health [15], 
we foresee tremendous opportunity for a 
GSS to help governments deliver targeted 
and more cost-effective responses to plant 
disease outbreaks.  
The International Plant Protection Con-
vention (IPPC), adopted in 1951, provides 
the basis for collaboration by participating 
countries in NPPOs and RPPOs to improve 
the awareness of threats to agriculture from 
the entry and spread of regulated pests and 
pathogens. This system of 183 NPPOs and 10 
RPPOs, in cooperation with the IPPC Secre-
tariat and Commission for Phytosanitary 
Measures, faces multiple challenges, includ-
ing the focus on a high number of regulated 
pests (352 in Europe alone), with limited hu-
man and financial resources.  
Two types of infrastructure currently de-
fine a country’s capacity for crop disease sur-
veillance: specific/targeted and general/pas-
sive [7]. Specific and targeted surveillance 
infrastructure consists of labs at entry and 
trade points, customs and border patrol, 
seed inspection, and phytosanitary services, 
and includes coordinated agricultural pest 
surveys designed to prevent the introduction 
and movement of specific pests and diseases. 
Most IPPC and NPPO policy efforts are tied to 
targeted surveillance, which requires trained 
personnel to recognize regulated pests and 
pathogens and to establish an area as “free 
from” a given pest or disease for trade and 
quarantine purposes [7]. Despite the sub-
stantial global targeted surveillance infra-
structure, only an estimated 2-6% of all 
cargo entering a country can be effectively 
screened; thus, actual movement of potential 
biological invasive species through official 
entry points is barely constrained [8].  
General or passive surveillance is aimed 
at detecting and diagnosing all pests and 
crop diseases, not just those that are regu-
lated. Passive surveillance personnel either 
spot diseases during field surveys or receive 
samples brought to labs distributed through-
out a country or region. These are almost al-
ways the first detectors when an outbreak is 
occurring, and are often loosely networked 
groups of citizens; scientists and trained 
agronomists; university plant pathology 
labs; fee-for-service clinics supporting 
grower industries; CGIAR plant pathology 
labs; national networked labs, such as the 
U.S. National Plant Diagnostic Network 
(NPDN); national extension service person-
nel; private crop consultants; and pesticide 
salespeople and applicators.  
For this infrastructure to be effective, con-
nections between first detectors and down-
stream responders must be well coordi-
nated. But, diagnosis capacity, information 
sharing and communications protocols are 
lacking or weakly established in most re-
gions. Our reflection on many disease out-
breaks is that whether in HIC or LIC, the pas-
sive surveillance infrastructure has the most 
in-field monitoring and trained eyes, but the 
least coordination from local to global. This is 
the sector we propose to network for the 
GSS, particularly including LIC, where risk as-
sessment, diagnostic capacities, data sharing, 
and communication protocols need to be 
strengthened. 
 
COMPONENTS OF A GSS 
The model for the GSS draws on lessons 
learned from previous outbreaks, estab-
lished and coordinated regional plant protec-
tion efforts and from the best practice imple-
mented in HICs, such as the EPPO, the U.S. 
NPDN, the EU Reference Labs, and the Global 
influenza surveillance and response system 
(GISRS) coordinated by the WHO [5] [6].  
Reviewing previous disease outbreaks 
helped to identify weakness that need to be 
strengthened and, strengths that could be 
leveraged in other regions.. One example is 
the recent cassava mosaic disease (CMD) 
outbreak in Southeast Asia. CMD is a viral 
disease that causes substantial yield loss in 
Africa, India and Sri Lankan and is an im-
portant impediment to trade in vegetatively-
propagated planting material. A university 
plant pathologist made the first report of a 
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new occurrence in Cambodia in 2015, alt-
hough these results were published in a sci-
entific journal until May 2016. Concerns 
within the region about the economic impli-
cations of recognizing the presence of the 
disease led to further delays in issue a cas-
sava warning, allowing CMD to spread into 
neighboring regions and countries. Key con-
straints included the relative shortage of 
trained personnel and virus diagnostics ca-
pacity in affected countries such as Cambo-
dia and Vietnam, and the inadequate infor-
mation exchange at the regional level on new 
disease outbreaks. Strengthening regional 
diagnostic hubs, data management, risk as-
sessment, and communication protocols 
would have contributed greatly to reducing 
the speed with which CMD spread through 
Southeast Asia. This has been clearly recog-
nized by stakeholder groups preparing a re-
gional mitigation strategy for CMD in South-
east Asia (GCP21, 2018). 
Another example is the wheat blast out-
break which emerged across eight districts 
in Bangladesh in 2016, spreading to around 
15,000 ha and causing yield losses up to 
100%. Here, coordinated rapid collection of 
diseased samples to generate pathogen se-
quence information, and recruitment of sev-
eral plant pathologists who volunteered to 
share unpublished data through an open sci-
ence web platform (OpenWheatBlast) re-
vealed that the fungus was closely related to 
the South American wheat blast pathogen 
and that it was most likely introduced to 
Bangladesh from South America [9]. Ten 
countries with no history of wheat blast have 
continued importing infected wheat from 
these regions. They have no information on 
the epidemic levels of the pathogen in the 
source country, which would enable policy 
decisions about quarantine or alternative 
sources for import. 
In Europe, an outbreak of Xylella fastidi-
osa bacterium has affected olive trees in It-
aly. Since the first official report in 2013, re-
gional initiatives have strengthened capacity 
of national diagnostic labs, facilitated com-
munication between experts, and increased 
preparedness of countries that were free 
from the bacterium. The European Plant 
Protection Organization (EPPO) Secretariat 
organized communication to raise aware-
ness about the threat posed by the pest. 
EPPO also coordinated an international 
group of experts to share information on di-
agnostic protocols in order to provide guide-
lines on the best tests for the region. The Eu-
ropean Food Safety Authority developed a 
pest risk analysis and several research pro-
jects were initiated to provide evidence to 
support policy [10]. All of these initiatives 
were built on the collaboration of experts 
from Europe, Brazil, and the United States 
and fed by a collaboration to develop an in-
ternational IPPC Standard for the diagnosis 
of Xylella fastidiosa. 
The GSS would comprise existing surveil-
lance systems worldwide, but with a deliber-
ate coordination of people, compilation and 
analysis of disease diagnostic data patterns, 
and a forward-looking goal of improved risk 
management at a global scale. It would create 
linkages between general and specific sur-
veillance entities across countries to increase 
coordination in high-consequence disease 
detection, allowing optimization of early re-
sponse and control. It would function 
through five interconnected networks: (i) di-
agnostic labs, (ii) risk assessment modeling 
teams, (iii) data standardization and man-
agement specialists, (iv) regular expert com-
munications, and (v) a distributed opera-
tions management system, all sharing a 
cross-cutting capacity-development compo-
nent. A pilot phase would focus on high-risk 
diseases causing high economic impact, in 
some of the world’s most important crops 
(maize, potato, cassava, rice, beans, and 
wheat) in LIC. This would strengthen the ca-
pacity and link critical components of exist-
ing networks to better respond to high-risk 
diseases. 
In the past decade, major advances have 
been made in disease diagnostics, especially 
through genome sequencing technologies; 
CRISPR-based diagnostics; bioinformatics 
tools for genomic epidemiology, genomic 
prediction, data mining, data analysis, and 
modeling; and expansion of social media 
platforms for information sharing [11]. Such 
advances will revolutionize the speed, accu-
racy, and wealth of information collected 
during disease outbreaks. One recent exam-
ple is a near real-time, genomics-based, 
point-of-care diagnostics platform for wheat 
yellow rust, Mobile And Real-time PLant dis-
Ease (MARPLE) diagnostics, which has been 
integrated into an existing wheat rust early 
warning system in Ethiopia to directly in-
form disease risk forecasting (see photo). 
However, the benefits of faster, more accu-
rate detection and diagnostic technologies 
have not been evenly applied to LIC, where 
emerging diseases can be particularly devas-
tating. Concurrent efforts to leverage and de-
ploy emerging technologies for disease mon-
itoring and management in LIC must occur to 
effectively reduce the impact of crop diseases 
locally and disease spread globally.  
The diagnostic laboratory network 
would promote standard protocols including 
those already proposed by IPPC, with ad-
vanced techniques for faster and more accu-
rate results and standardized information 
management and reporting. It would be co-
ordinated by “regional hubs” that support 
the “spoke” diagnostic labs in a region, focus-
ing specifically on diagnostic labs and exten-
sion services in LIC, in a similar approach as 
the U.S. NPDN with its five regional diagnos-
tic networks. Most LIC plant protection ser-
vices are under-resourced, so the GSS would 
strengthen labs, through training, regional 
connectivity, and resources. The regional 
hubs would link and support current NPPOs 
capacity and infrastructure for lab diagnos-
tics and field-based surveillance with exten-
sion agents, plant breeders, and remote sens-
ing-based platforms. The regional hubs 
would work with spoke teams to identify 
high-risk crops and pathogens based on local 
priorities. Regional hubs in collaboration 
with RPPOs and the IPPC would work to fa-
cilitate consensus with regional partners to 
update and coordinate existing standard op-
erating procedures for diagnostics, sampling 
methods, and surveillance approaches. 
These capabilities would be integrated with 
the Risk assessment and Communication 
networks to support early field-based detec-
tion, diagnostic confirmation, and timely re-
porting in each region.  
The current standards for pest risk anal-
ysis for quarantine pests were established by 
the IPPC in 2001. Using these standards as 
guidance, the risk assessment network 
would support the collection, integration, 
and management of risk- related data to de-
velop analytical modeling and visualization 
tools, and for interpreting and communi-
cating (via the GSS Communication and Data 
management networks) to key stakeholders 
through emergency alerts, regular bulletins, 
and updated priority lists for crop diseases. 
This network would recommend sampling 
strategies, supply updated risk estimates to 
the Diagnostic laboratory network, and 
would contribute to capacity development 
along with NPPO, universities, government 
personnel, and private groups.  
The Data management network would 
develop consensus with participating coun-
tries on data collection standards and access 
protocols to support the collection, curation, 
storage, analysis, and management of plant 
disease data. This would be based on rules of 
data access and use, such as in public health 
emergencies and the Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (PIP) Framework from the 
WHO, which shares genetic sequence data in 
a rapid, timely, and systematic manner from 
the originating lab and among WHO GISRS 
labs. The GSS would provide data to inform 
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the Risk assessment and Communication 
networks to guide timely responses.  
The GSS would incentivize data sharing 
(including open-source data) by deploying 
FAIR (findable, accessible, interoperable, 
and reusable) data principles [12] although 
accessibility outside the system would be de-
cided on a per country or regional basis. Alt-
hough individual countries might want to 
limit public availability to sensitive crop dis-
ease data, and threats to sharing data have 
been reported [13], the GSS would ensure 
that norms for sharing information and data 
usage are established. The GSS, through this 
network, would work with the plant pathol-
ogy community and seek support from plant 
pathology journals, similar to the agreement 
and support from the International Commit-
tee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE), by not 
prejudicing journal publication because of 
pre-publication dissemination of infor-
mation that is critical to public health emer-
gencies, as when declared by WHO. A code of 
ethics for plant health emergencies by The 
International Society for Plant Pathology 
(ISPP) is under discussion. The benefits of 
coordinated efforts to share pathogen-asso-
ciated data, in the case of the outbreak of 
wheat blast in Bangladesh, allowed identify-
ing the most likely origin guiding the deci-
sions and efforts. 
The Communication network would fa-
cilitate dialogue across all networks, inter-
nally to the system and externally to partici-
pating host governments, for raising 
awareness and coordinating timely re-
sponses to disease outbreaks. This network 
would expedite the transfer of knowledge 
derived from the Diagnostic and Risk assess-
ment networks by identifying the most ap-
propriate source and ensuring the timely, re-
sponsible, and secure transfer of knowledge.  
Key members of international plant pro-
tection organizations; partner networks 
such as NPDN, IPPC, and RPPOs; and CGIAR 
liaisons would oversee the global manage-
ment of regional operations. This opera-
tional management network would provide 
governance for an integrated surveillance 
system to promote global awareness of and 
preparedness for crop disease outbreaks. Its 
main activities would be operating the net-
works, coordinating partners, administrat-
ing budgets, fundraising, and establishing 
policies and guidelines.Each network would 
include capacity development, ensuring that 
local and regional institutions increase their 
capacity at three different levels by training 
individuals to increase skills and knowledge; 
providing resources, services, and infor-
mation to strengthen organizations; and fa-
cilitating institutional cooperation and col-
laboration.  
 
IMPACT AND IMPLEMENTATION  
The GSS would detect threats and risks to 
global food supplies and support timely re-
sponse. Countries and regions will benefit by 
increasing their capacity to predict, detect, 
communicate, and effectively respond to 
emerging crop disease outbreaks. This will 
be possible by leveraging different lessons 
learned from existing national and regional 
plant protection systems, such as NPDN es-
tablished in 2003 [5] or EPPO created in 
1951. The proposed GSS would need to 
tackle challenges such as enhancing aware-
ness with each country’s Ministry of Agricul-
ture, and among RPPO and policymakers 
about the GSS and the function of the re-
gional hubs; and establishing an integrated 
governance approach with long-term buy-in 
and sustainable funding. 
In the IPPC development agenda for 
2020-2030, IPPC and FAO highlighted the 
need to strengthen surveillance systems, 
with diagnostic laboratory networks as a key 
component. We encourage the annual G20 
Agriculture Ministers Meeting, the World 
Bank Group, and FAO, among others, to join 
efforts toward enhancing cooperation for a 
multi-year action plan for the proposed GSS 
to more effectively reduce the impact of crop 
diseases and increase global food security. 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
Figure 1. Recent disease outbreaks affecting 
farmers in LIC as well as in Europe: (a) stem 
rust symptoms on durum wheat in Sicily, It-
aly (2017, by Biagio Randazzo); (b) cassava 
mosaic disease symptoms in Cambodia 
(2016); (c) wheat blast disease symptoms 
spotted in Bangladesh (2016, by Tofazzal Is-
lam); (d) capacity building in emerging ge-
nomic-based surveillance techniques 
through deployment of Mobile And Real-
time PLant disEase (MARPLE) diagnostics in 
Ethiopia (by Matt Heaton, John Innes Cen-
tre). 
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